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THE U.S. IMPORTER'S PERSPECTIVE ON U.S.
ANTITRADE ACTIONS AGAINST KOREA
AND TAIWAN
Valerie A. Slater*
Good afternoon. It is certainly my pleasure to speak to you today.
After listening today to so many learned speakers who are experienced
in the area of Korean and Taiwanese trade with the U.S., I thought I
would tell you one of my favorite stories.
The story has it that during a May Day celebration, an American
dignitary was in the stands with Soviet officials, watching the parade
go by. First, trucks carrying missiles passed. They were followed by
several miles of Soviet soldiers marching in perfect step, and they were
followed by many regiments of young Red Guards perfectly dressed in
their marching uniforms. Tanks and other military equipment came
next. At the end of this very long procession there was a small group
of well-dressed, but confused-looking people. The American asked
who those people were. The Soviet hosts replied, "Oh, those are our
trade lawyers. They can do more damage than everything else put
together." In that spirit, I will try to do a little more damage today.
What I am going to talk about today, briefly, is U.S. antidumping
and countervailing duty law as it relates to U.S. importers, how U.S.
importers react to it, and what it means to them. When I say U.S.
importers, I am principally referring to unrelated importers, not U.S.
subsidiaries of Taiwanese or Korean companies. These independent
companies view themselves, for the most part, as innocent bystanders
in the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures. The reason
for that is rather clear-the issues of dumping and subsidies have little
to do with the importer. "Dumping" is determined by relative prices
in the producer's or exporter's home market and prices that are being
charged to the importer. Sometimes the cost of production in the
home market will be the benchmark with which U.S. prices are com-
pared. In countervailing duty cases, the unfair trade practice at issue
is a government subsidy to a foreign supplier. That is not something
about which the importer normally knows or with which he is in-
volved. What the U.S. importer does know is that he is a businessman
who is marketing a product for which he sees a good market niche.
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He is probably selling it because he has received or expects to receive a
good return. He may have made quite an investment in marketing this
product, particularly where he has had a long-term relationship with
the supplier. Then, one day, he is engaging in his normal competitive
activity in the marketplace and is faced with the prospect that he may
have to put up a substantial amount of money to continue bringing
this merchandise into the country.
There have been many reactions to this reality. The first reaction,
often expressed in much stronger terms than this, is, "This is not fair!
I am a U.S. company. What is my government doing to me? I am a
good competitor. Why are they doing this?" The next reaction, after
the initial shock and anger, is, "What should I do now? Where can I
go?" Neither of these questions is easy to answer, but they are ques-
tions that those of you who practice trade law know we face every day.
I would like to talk a little bit today about what kinds of problems lead
the importer to have this reaction from both a practical and technical
point of view. I also want to mention briefly some of the things that
may make it easier for the importer to cope with, although certainly
not to accept, antidumping or countervailing duty cases.
I know it was mentioned this morning that foreign producers often
feel like they do not have to deal with dumping cases or CVD cases;
that is a problem for the importer. Foreign producers think, "Our
importers will take care of it." Indeed, we see that happen from time
to time, particularly where foreign exporting companies are small,
family-run concerns. Unfortunately, the importers, as I said, view
themselves as innocent bystanders. They, for a variety of reasons, may
not feel compelled to jump in. One simple reason may be that they
have one or more other sources of the merchandise and it may not be
difficult for them to go elsewhere, especially if it is not a situation in
which there is any particular identification with the foreign producer,
or if the product is fungible. They say, "Fine. If there is going to be a
problem with Taiwan, I will get my widgets from country X. If the
situation with Taiwan clears up, I will consider going back." This is
one initial reaction.
The second reason that some importers do not actively address
themselves to antidumping or countervailing duty actions is that they
are unfamiliar with these cases and the issues they present. This is
true in the case of very large companies as well as small ones. Dump-
ing and countervailing duty laws are still somewhat obscure to many
in the business community. It is not an issue about which the general
business community is sophisticated.
Once you get past all those hurdles and the reality sets in, what
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happens? When an antidumping petition or subsidy petition is filed,
the market is automatically thrown into a state of uncertainty, in part
because of a lack of information about the cases, and in part because of
the simple fact that no one knows whether and what level of additional
extra duties or deposits will be imposed. Secondly, within a matter of
weeks after the cases are filed, the International Trade Commission
(I.T.C.) sends out questionnaires to importers of the product. The im-
porter often thus receives word that the trade case, which he may not
understand, has been filed. He opens his mail and finds a thirty-,
forty-, or fifty-page questionnaire from the I.T.C. It asks him to re-
port information on his company's sales, imports, profits, specific
prices and sometimes costs, to give names of customers, including
phone numbers of contacts. In practice, many importers say, "I do
not have time for this." That is the end of their contact with the an-
tidumping proceeding. The next contact the importer may have with
the case, however, will be the day when his shipment hits the port and
the customs official says, "We cannot turn this shipment over to you
unless you provide us with a bond to cover estimated dumping du-
ties." With that, things begin to happen.
What I would like to do is to give you some idea of how these
procedures work and show what points along the way are important
for the importer. Normally, when an antidumping case is com-
menced, let's say in January 1988, there is a petition filed. As far as
the importer is concerned, at that point nothing changes. Products
can still come into the market; he is not required to put up cash at the
port. The only difference may be some uncertainty created in the
market.
Forty-five days after the petition is filed, some time in February
1988, the I.T.C. issues its first decision, a preliminary ruling on the
question of injury. In most antidumping and countervailing duty
cases, duties cannot be imposed unless the imports are found to have
caused or threatened to cause material injury to U.S. producers. At
this point, for the importer, nothing has yet happened. Even if the
I.T.C. finds that this is a reasonable indication that imports are caus-
ing injury, nothing happens as a practical matter. The importer is
likely to have received an ITC questionnaire early in that forty-five
day period, but that may be the extent of his involvement.
The case then goes to the Commerce Department. At the earliest,
in June, (roughly six months after the petition is filed), the Commerce
Department issues its first preliminary determination. It will be a de-
tailed decision concerning the extent to which the imports were
dumped. When this decision is published, if it is affirmative, i.e., there
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is a finding that the goods were dumped, they will not be permitted to
enter the U.S. unless the importer of record posts a bond. The bond
will be equal to the percentage of dumping found in the preliminary
decision. The bonds must be posted by the importer of record, and
may not be provided by the exporter.
Some time later, at the earliest in August, the Commerce Depart-
ment will issue a final antidumping determination. The duty rate may
increase or decrease from the percentage found in the preliminary rul-
ing. Some forty-five days after that, in October 1988, the I.T.C. will
issue its final injury decision. If it is an affirmative decision, an anti-
dumping order will be issued. We have now gone for ten months since
initiation, although the procedure can take up to fourteen months.
Importers could still bring investigated goods into the country during
that period, as long as bonds are posted. Once the I.T.C. renders its
final determination, however, normally the bonding requirement is re-
placed with a "cash deposit on entry" rule. The importer must now
put up cash equal to the dumping margin in order to enter the goods.
That cash may not be deposited by the foreign producer, nor may the
importer be reimbursed by the foreign producer.
What does the importer do in this situation? If the deposit or bond
rate is so high that he cannot afford to continue importing from the
affected producer, or if supply alternatives are readily available he will
go to another source. If the rate is such that cash deposits are accepta-
ble commercially and/or the importer is committed to the exporter, he
may continue to import, despite the cash deposits. In the event that
imports continue, the importer and/or the exporter may choose to
utilize the legal process for recouping cash deposits. One way to cope
with it, and this has been increasingly looked at, is to put up the cash
deposit and then go into the next procedure.
In the U.S., we have something called an administrative review
procedure. When a dumping order is issued, Customs is still not col-
lecting the dumping duties. Rather, Customs is collecting deposits to
cover potential dumping duties. These deposits were based on the
dumping found to exist for prior entries. Under U.S. dumping or
countervailing duty procedure, each year after the publication of an
order, the importer can request the Commerce Department to deter-
mine whether its entries for the preceding year were dumped, and if
so, whether they were dumped by more or less than the cash deposit
rate in effect upon entry. The foreign producer may have changed its
pricing policy. The U.S. importer may have increased its prices. Nev-
ertheless, every one of these entries has been covered upon entry by a
cash deposit. Thus, every year, in the anniversary month of the issu-
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ance of the order, the importer may say, "Please, Commerce Depart-
ment, review my entries and give me back my deposits because, as you
see, I have not been dumping or my margin of dumping was less than
the cash deposit rate." The domestic producers who brought the peti-
tion may also ask for a particular producer's imports to be reviewed.
Commerce will perform the review if requested and has up to a year to
complete that process. If the importer is lucky, after one year, there
will be a decision issued for the reviewed entries, and the importer will
get back any money to which he was entitled because his exporter was
not dumping. For an importer, it is extremely difficult to continue
importing a product with any significant margin, even though you
know that eventually it will be found not to have been dumped, be-
cause of the fact that cash is tied up in the meantime. The process is
lengthy. In fact, Commerce frequently does not meet the one year
deadline for review completion. Some reviews have covered entries
that were made seven to ten years earlier. The procedure can be very
frustrating for importers from that perspective.
My purpose here is not to be critical of the Commerce Depart-
ment. The problem is partly one of the Department's administrative
burden and heavy case load, and largely a function of the way the laws
were set up. This is, for many importers, the most difficult thing to
understand about the antidumping laws.
One last comment about the administrative review procedure is
that if an importer has the funds to survive it and decides to "stick it
out," wait for the administrative reviews, and get a lower (or zero)
dumping margin, it is important to realize that refunds may not be
made as soon as the Commerce Department delivers its decision. It is
not that simple. The refund checks are issued by the National Finance
Center, an office which is also involved with dispersing other funds
held and issued by Customs. There is normally some processing time
involved. The delay in receiving refunds can sometimes be an added
frustration.
Once an importer understands the administrative review process,
the next question is, "What else can I do?" Well, he can, as mentioned
earlier, import from another source. Sometimes that does happen. In
some cases, the importer's or exporter's pricing will change, or subsi-
dies are discontinued and the unfair trade practice is ameliorated or
abolished. A number of other different approaches may be considered,
based, of course, on the particular industry. Sometimes the importer,
(most often jointly with the exporter), will consider establishing a pro-
duction facility in the U.S. Sometimes the importer may seek to
purchase from the same producer, sourcing from a plant in a third
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country. Sometimes importers (and exporters) have been unconcerned
with dumping or countervailing duty orders because they believe that
the product is at the end of its cycle and will be replaced by the next
generation of the product.
In considering appropriate reactions to an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty order, it is imperative that importers now be aware of
the "anti-circumvention" provisions of the 1988 Trade Act. With
these provisions, Congress sought to give the Commerce Department
the authority to deal with certain situations in which importers or ex-
porters are trying to unfairly "get around" the dumping, or counter-
vailing duty orders. There are now four situations, all less than clearly
defined, found in the 1988 Trade Act in which a dumping order essen-
tially can be "expanded" to prevent circumvention.
19 U.S.C., section 1677(j), authorizes the Commerce Department
to include within the scope of a previously-issued antidumping or
countervailing duty order the same kind of merchandise completed or
assembled in the United States using parts or components produced in
the country covered by the order, if the value added by U.S. assembly
is "small." Similarly, the Department may include the same kind of
merchandise completed or assembled in a third country using mer-
chandise subject to or produced in the country covered by the order if
the value added by assembly is "small."
Thus, the Commerce Department may apply its antidumping or
countervailing duty order to subject merchandise produced in the
country covered by the order, but assembled or completed in the U.S.
or elsewhere. While the idea is to prevent "circumvention" by chang-
ing the situs of minor assembly or completion operations, it is unclear
what amount of value-added will be considered "small." Commerce
will examine each allegation of circumvention on its own facts, and
exercises a great deal of discretion in so doing.
The 1988 Trade Act also authorized Commerce to include within
the scope of its dumping and countervailing duty investigations and
orders merchandise which is "altered in form or appearance in minor
respects" from the merchandise otherwise covered by the investigation
or order. "Minor respects" is not statutorily defined. Finally, Com-
merce may now include within the scope of an order certain "later-
developed" merchandise. The law essentially seeks to ensure the via-
bility of an antidumping order even though the next generation of the
product replaces the one that was at issue at the time of the Depart-
ment's investigation.
While these provisions in some .respects formalize authority that
the Commerce Department previously exercised in any event, they
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create another set of concerns for importers seeking to cope with trade
relief actions.
What is an importer to do? One thing that importers can do is to
become aware of some of the issues, many of which are founded in
U.S. law and, in some cases in the GATT Antidumping Code itself.
More importantly, at this time, importers as well as domestic produ-
cers should be working through their government to express their con-
cerns about existing import relief procedures.
There will at some point be legislation in the area of the antidump-
ing and countervailing duty laws, but that is very unlikely to come in
the next year. We are unlikely to see additional trade legislation mak-
ing any significant changes until at least 1991. In the meantime, inter-
ested parties-both foreign and domestic-should be paying close and
active attention to developments in the GATT Uruguay Round.
There is another action that importers can take when faced with
import relief cases. The 1988 Trade Act changed the I.T.C. injury
proceedings significantly. There is a new openness to the proceedings
which allows all of the parties litigating an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty case to have access, through their counsel, to all of the
data that is submitted to the Commission. We have come out of the
Star Chamber, and injury proceedings now permit all parties to com-
ment meaningfully on the information before the Commission-infor-
mation that will be used to assess the impact of imports on domestic
producers. In this regard, importers are most often the parties who
know what is going on in the U.S. market. They are the people who
have the information which will allow an assessment of whether im-
ports are the cause of the problems in the domestic industry. Import-
ers sometimes are, but, as a rule, could become more active in that
process-not just reactive, filling out an occasional questionnaire, but
very pro-active in impressing their view of "no causation" before the
I.T.C.
In closing, there are not any easy "answers" to how importers can
cope with import relief cases. I can tell you it is very difficult for them.
However, by being informed about the legal processes involved in im-
port relief actions and the options available to them under those
processes, importers will have the ability to take meaningful, affirma-
tive steps when faced with such actions.
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